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CARL. E. PLETSCH"* 
INTRODUCTION: 
THE @TESTION OF PSYCHOANALYTIC KNOWLEDGE 
Reading through Sigmund Freud's case studies in chronological 
order is a most instructive experience for anyone interested in the 
intellectual history of psychoanalysis. One quickly sees, for example, 
how Freud's technique evolved from the methodical and rather intru- 
sive attempts to dispel particular symptoms that we observe in Studies on 
Hystem'a ( 1  8 9 5 )  to the method of free association that he describes in his 
report on the case of Dora (1905). Or one sees how Freud's conception 
of the transference developed, from the primitive notion of transference 
as something to be avoided or dispelled, to the mature conception of 
transference as the invaluable center of analysis, the very phenomenon 
that has to be analyzed (again in the analysis of Dora). In this paper 1 
shall review Freud's case studies with still another trajectory in mind: 
how Freud's sense of the significance of his written case studies 
themselves evolved. 1 shall show how his inital embarrassment over the 
necessity of describing his cases in great detail was eventually supplan- 
ted by a confidence that his case studies were important vehicles of 
psychoanalytic knowledge. As his attitude changed, his initial anxiety 
about how other medical and natural scientific readers would adjudicate 
his cases was displaced by a willingness to assert delicate, tenuous 
hypotheses in his cases, largely for the benefit of the psychoanalytic 
community itself. And on a more abstract and perhaps less conscious 
level, the positivistic belief in the importante of theory and the objective 
verifiability of hypotheses that Freud had subscribed to from the time he 
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had decided to study medicine was at least temporarily challenged by 
another view of knowledge, a view that 1 shall try to clarify in this paper. 
My examination of Freud's case studies is necessarily an interroga- 
tion of only a part of the Freudian oeuvre. But it leads inexorably to the 
question of psychoanalytic knowledge, its locus, character, and epis- 
temological status. For we cannot examine the cases without considering 
their relationship to Freud's other writing. We cannot help wondering 
whether Freud wrote his case studies for a specific readership, for 
example, or whether the cases communicate to their readers in a unique 
fashion. These questions will lead us to delineate an important fissure in 
Freud's thinking and to speculate upon how Freud's most peculiarly 
psychoanlitic knowledge differs from other forms and kinds of know- 
ledge. 
Two notions taken from the discourse oEghilosophy of science will 
assist us in our examination of Freud's case studies: ((exemplarsa and 
«personal knowledge)). We must not reify these notions, however, or 
permit them to distract us from the question of psychoanalytic know- 
ledge. Let it be clear from the outset that 1 am not trying to defend 
psychoanalysis or to answer the (tedious) question of whether or not 
psychoanalysis is a science. Nor am 1 trying to demonstrate the validity 
of these notions of (texemplar)) and ((personal knowledge)) in the 
discourse of the philosophy of science. 1 am using these notions in 
connection with Freud's case studies for the much more modest 
heuristic purpose of illuminating the place of case studies in the 
discourse of psychoanalysis and speculating upon the nature of psy- 
choanalytic knowledge, a peculiar sort of knowledge that 1 believe 
remains to be adequately described. 
This is not the place to elaborate upon how the term «exemplar» has 
been used by descriptive philosophers of science, but 1 must admit that 
my understanding of the way in which Freud's (and later psychoana- 
, lysts') case studies constitute exemplars in psychoanalysis diverges in 
one very important respect from the meaning of the term given by 
Thomas Kuhn. In his attempt to show that shared theory and corres- 
pondence rules are not sufficient to explain disciplinary coherence in 
certain natural sciences, Kuhn used the term ((paradigm)) in one of its 
senses to mean ashared examples of successful practice)), which students 
of these disciplines learn, and which then serve to maintain the 
coherence of their research community (1). In Kuhn's later essays, these 
(1) In his later essays Kuhn uses the term ((exemplars)) for this sense of his original terrn 
((paradigm)). Cf: The Structure ofdcientzfi Revolutions. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
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are termed exemplars. My impression is that psychoanalytic case studies 
-Freud's in particular-- serve the purpose of helping psychoanalysts 
identie the problems posed by their partients and permit psychoana- 
lysts al1 over the world, sitting done in their consultation rooms with 
their patients, to proceed in parallel fashion, even though the examples are 
not always successful. The case of Dora comes to mind once again: the 
failure of Freud's attempts to reason with Dora and her abrupt termi- 
nation of analysis before therapy could be effected does not seem to 
detract from the value of the case. The presentation of such an awkward 
case as an exemplar might well give a descriptive philosopher of science 
like Kuhn pause, to say nothing of a neo-positivist. But this seems 
unproblematic here, precisely because 1 am not trying to defend 
psychoanalysis as a science or demonstrate the validity of the notion of 
exemplars. 
Whatever one thinks of psychoanalysis, it is a fact that Freud's case 
studies have been extremely important vehicles of the tradition of 
psychoanalytic knowledge. Somehow Freud's cases still communicate 
essential knowledge to psychoanalysts. It is much easier, however, to say 
what they are not than to specifj what they are and how they work in the 
discourse of psychoanalysis. Although they are by no means devoid of 
theoretical considerations, for example, they are al1 highly detailed 
investigations of quite idiosyncratic cases. Freud seldom even claimed 
for them the value of illustrations of theory, and as time went on he 
ceased to make such claims altogether. And as 1 have already suggested, 
they are not quite like exemplars in that they obviously do not depend 
upon being examples of successful practice. Many conversations with 
psychoanalysts and a reading of the memoir literature of psychoanalysil 
suggest, however, that what psychoanalysts derive from their study of 
Freud's cases is a sense of how Freud thought, and, more particularly, 
how he thought with his patients. Even to the non-psychoanalytic reader 
Freud's case studies seem to communicate how it feels to do psychoa+ 
nalysis and learn from patients. In contrast to his theoretical writings 
like the Three Essays on the Theory of SexualiS, or expository-didactic ones 
like the Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Freud's case studies may be 
the locus of intersubjectivity in psychoanalysis. It is even tempting to 
think that the communication between Freud and the psychoanalytic 
readers of his case studies is modeled on the kind of communication 
that obtains between malyst and patient in psychoanalysis proper. If 
this is approximately trile, it suggests Freud's e x e m p l q  cases function 
1962, and more specifically The Essential Tension: selected Studies in Scientzfic Tradition and 
Change. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1977, pp. 306 and 318-319. 
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as a kind of ((personal knowledge)), borrowing now from Michael 
Polanyi (2). Studying them, psychoanalysts tacitly learn to think like 
Freud. 
The question foremost in my mind while writing this paper is how the 
status Freud accorded the knowledge deposited in his case studies evolved in his own 
thinking. But other questions can never be far from the surface of inquiry: 
how, for example, have Freud's case studies been utilized by his 
followers in psychoanalysis? How have later psychoanalysts reinter- 
preted these case studies? And how have the new cases reported by 
other psychoanalysts reshaped the Corpus of psychoanalytic knowledge? 
Although 1 shall not be able to answer these questions in the brief 
compass of a paper on Freud's own thinking, 1 believe my present 
inquiry is given greater significance by the fact that psychoanalysts have 
indeed studied Freud's cases as exemplary solutions to problems. They 
have too, 1 believe, learned more and more consistently from the case 
studies than from Freud's more traditionally formulated theoretical 
propositions. The whole process of psychoanalytic education enshrined 
in the institutes of psychoanalysis suggests this, although again it would 
take a separate paper to demonstrate it conclusively. It is very largely the 
case studies, Freud's and the cases published subsequently in the same 
spirit by his followers, that have enabled psychoanalysis to maintain its 
great methodological coherence for so long, and during a period when 
most of Freud's formal theoretical statements have been shown to be at 
least partially false (3).  
Psychoanalysts are of course not al1 fully aware of the fact that case 
studies play such an important role in their discipline. Many if not most 
psychoanalysts are still consciously wedded to a positivistic conception 
of science, and they place great store in the theory of psychoanalysis 
when they represent it to the public at large. If 1 am right:, however, they 
(2) See POLANM, M.  (1958), Personal Knowledge: towards a post-critica1 Philosophy. Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press. 
(3) On psychoanaiytic education see: GOODMAN, S. (ed.) (1977), Psychoanalytic Education 
and Research. New York, International Universities Press, and LEWIN, B. D.; ROSS, H. 
(1960), Psychoanalytic Education in the United States. New York, International Universities 
Press. For evidence of the role of case studies in maintaining the coherence of the 
psychoanaiytic discipline, one should aiso consider the periodicai literature of psychoa- 
naiysis and the prominence of case studies in it. Two other publications are aiso 
interesting in this context: one, didactic, is Hedda Bolgar's essay on The Case Study 
Method, in WOLMAN, B. B. (ed.) (1965), The Handbook ofclinical Psychology. New York, 
McGraw-Hill; the other, historial, is Harold Greenwaid's edition of Great Cases in 
Psychoanalysis. New York, Ballantine Books, 1959, where the editor explicitly suggests that 
these most frequently studied and cited cases constitute a more significant history of 
psychoanalysis than a recounting of the evolution of theory or technique. 
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are much more defensive about the fragility of this body of theory than 
they need to be. For ~ rhen  they communicate with their patients and 
with each other, they are demonstrably more interested in the subtleties 
of insight found in particular cases generated by.their method than they 
are in the validity of general theoretical propositioris. 
This suggests that psychoanalytic knowledge, the knowledge pecu- 
liar to psychoanalysis, is constituted rather differently than the know- 
ledge of a more thoroughly theory-based science. In fact, 1 use the word 
«knowledge» in referenice to psychoanalysis, instead of «science», pre- 
cisely in order to suggest that the very question of science is misleadding 
when applied to psychoanalysis (4). If so, then the great energy expen- 
ded in trying to reformulate Freud's theoretical propositions to make 
them experimentally teistable may not -in spite of the value such efforts 
may have for other purposes- contribute much to our understanding 
of what psychoanalytic knowledge really is (5). A truly descriptive 
(4) Several other disciplines of questionables scientificity have applied for the status of 
special forms of knowledge in order to circumvent the question of science, which seems 
always to entail a comparison with physics. This tactic gives rise to the plural form, 
aknowledges)). This seenis novel but it could become as common as «sciences» is now. 
And since «knowledge» is so much less freighted with ideology than «science», this might 
facilitate more and more genuine descriptive approaches to the intellectual capitals of 
the anomalous disciplines of p~~choanalysis, ethnography, history, etc. In following this 
suggestion, however, one necessarily raises the alternative question of «art» or ccrafb, 
' 
and that two will need to be differentiated before it wiii be useful. 
(5) For the efforts to test Freud's theories experimentally, see EYSENCK, H. J.; WILSON, G. 
D. (eds.) (1973), The Experimental Study of Freudiam Theories, London, Methuen, and 
SARNOFF, 1. (1 97 l ) ,  Testing Freudian Concepts, New- York, Springer. More recendy 
Seymour Fisher and Roger Greenberg have catalogued and analyzed the vast literature 
devoted to'experimental study of Freud's theories in their book The Scientiflc Credibility of 
Freud's Theories and Therafy. New York, Basic Books, 1977; the same authors have edited a 
book of exemplary tests of Freudian theories, entitied The Scientific Evaluation of Freud's 
Theories and Therapy. New York, Basic Books, 1978. 
On Freud's theories more generally, their genesis, their «style», and their status as 
science, see ELLENBERGER, H. (1970), The Discovely of the Unconscious. New York, Basic 
Books; various papers by Robert R. Holt, e.g, Two Influences on Freud's Scientific 
Thought: a Fragrnent of intellectual Biography, in: WHITE, R. W. (ed.) (1963), The Study 
oflives, New York, Atherton Press, pp. 364-387, Freud's Cognitive Style, American Zmago 
22, 163-179 (1965), and A Review of Some of Freud's Biological Assumption and their 
Influence on his Theories, in: GREENFIELD, N. S.; LEWIS, W. C. (eds.) (1965), 
Psychoanalysis and curreni! biological Thought, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 
pp. 93-124; GEDO, J. 15.; GOLDBERG, A. (1973), Models of the Mind: a psychoanalytic 
Theory, Chicago, Univeriiity of Chicago Press. GEDO, J. E.; POLLOCK, G. H. (eds.) 
(1976), Freud: the Fusion of Science and Humanism, New York, International Universities 
Press; the work of Roy Schaefer, especially Action: its Place in Psychoanalytic Interpre- 
tation and Theory, The Annual of Psychoanalysis, 1, 159-1 96 (1 973) and A New Languagefor 
Psychoanalysis, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1976; and most recently, Frank 
Sulloway's Freud: Biologist ofthe Mind, New York, Basic Books (1979). 
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account of psychoanalysis, 1 am suggesting, would have to pay much 
more attention to case studies as repositories and vehicles of this 
knowledge than has been the case thus far. Such a descriptive account 
would of course involve an extensive study of the periodical literature of 
psychoanalysis, its monographs, and of psychoanalytic education 'as 
practiced in the institutes. The present paper is only a beginning in that 
direction, an attempt to see how Freud came to the tentative conclusion 
that case studies were the genre of peculiarly psychoanalytic knowledge, 
and (as a corollary) to aim his more theoretical statements at the 
extrapsychoanalytic reader. It is of course also an attempt to pose the 
question of psychoanalityc knowledge as a question of discourse. 
Freud published his first case studies jointly with Joseph Breuer, 
whose patient ((Arma 0.)) had actually invented the ((talking cure)) that 
constituted the rudimentary psychoanalytic method that Freud practi- 
ced in the 1890's. These first case studies appeared in Studies on Hysteria 
in 1895. From that year until 191 5 when Freud completed his case 
history of the Wolf Man (From the History ofan Infantile Neurosis, which was 
not published until 191 8), his method was continually evolving. And 
especially during the later half of this period, Freud's energies were 
dedicated very largely to the formation of a school of disciples and 
institutionalizing psychoanalysis. We shall see that Freud's preoccupa- 
tions with his method of investigation and with forming a community of 
psychoanalytic investigators governed his innovative use of case studies. 
1 shall focus here in turn upon each of the case studies Freud wrote in 
this twenty year period. 
1. STUDIES ON HYSTERIA I 
Studies on Hysteria is one of the least coherent works in the Freudian 
Corpus. For one reason, it was written by two authors who did not agree 
entirely on its substance. For another, the principal author had not yet 
completed his so-called self-analysis or even begun the synthesis of his 
ideas that he would publish as the Interpretation ofDreams in 1900. Thus 
Studies on Hysteria remained a series of fragments, but its fragmentary 
and tentative nature permits an unhindered view of the authors' anxiety 
about the case studies they report in it. ~reud's '  and Breuer's concerns 
were not unlike what any late nineteenth-century natural scientists 
would have felt when, still caught in the throes of giving birth to a new 
kind of knowledge, they could only report their fragmentary insights in 
case studies. 
In his study of Anna O., for example, Breuer felt obliged to «excuse» 
himself for reciting the details of her case by drawing an analogy 
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between Anna 0. and the clarity of the protoplasm of the eggs of the sea- 
urchin which enable the histology student to see what happens in the 
eggs of other species whose egg-protoplasm is opague: «The interest of 
the present case seems to me above al1 to reside in the extreme clarity 
and intelligibility of its pathogenesis)). Breuer's analogy was later used by 
Freud too, as the editors of the Standard Edition of his writings point out. 
And his general argumenit that pathology may illuminate the workings 
of the healthy personality became an important justification for the 
value of psychoanalytic research. But it is interesting to note that both of 
these ideas arose in response to Breuer's (and Freud's) anxiety about 
reporting in such detail on a single unusual example. Strangely enough, 
the sea-urchin analogy is actually inappropriate in this most important 
respect, since Anna 0. did not constitute a typical exarnple of a different 
species but an individual of the same species whose pathology might 
have made her wholly idiosyncratic. Thus the analogy serves principally 
to mask the problem which natural scientists of the time would have 
found most unsettling (6). 
The Story of Anna O. -now thought to have been Bertha Pap- 
penheim in real life: the social worker, philanthropist and founder of the 
Jüdischer Frauenbund- was the first and most extraordinary of the cases 
reported in Studies on Hysteria. Henri Ellenberger describes Freud's 
learning of the story of Breuer's patient, along with his experience with 
Charcot at the Salpetriere in Paris, as one of the two personal experien- 
ces that led him to devise a new theory of the neuroses (7). Breuer had 
treated Anna O. in the early 1880's and for several reasons was uncom- 
(6) STRACHEY, J., et al. (eds.), The Standard Edition ofthe Complete Psychological Works ofSigmund 
Freud, London, Hogarth, vol. 2, p. 41. The analogy may seem improbable today, but in 
the intellectual climate of physiological psychiatry that prevailed in the 1890's it was not 
unusual-see SULLOWAY, F'. (1 979), op. cit. 
(7) ELLENBERGER, H. (1970), op. cit., p. 480. Ellenberger distinguishes these two personal 
experiences from the larger trends in neurology and psychiatry that also contributed to 
Freud's thinking about the neuroses. 
The writings of later psychoanalysts on Anna O. / Bertha Pappenheim are too numerous 
to list. A few of the more irnportant: ELLENBERGER, H. F., The Story of Anna O.: a 
critical Review with new Data, Journal ofthe History ofthe Behavioral Sciences, 8, 267-269 
(1972); JENSEN, E. M., Anna O. - a Study of her later Life, Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 39, 
269-293, (1970); MEISSNER, W. W. A Study on Hysteria: Anna O. Redivivia, The Annual 
of Psychoanalysis, 7 ,  17-52 (1979); POLLOCK, G. H., The Possible Significance of 
Childhood Object Loss in the Josef Breuer -Bertha Pappenheim (Anna O.)-  Sigmund 
Freud Relationship, Journal ofthe American Psychoanalytic Association, 16, 7 11-739 (1968), 
Bertha Pappenheim's pathological Mourning possible Effects of Childhood Sibling Loss, 
Ibid., 20, 476-493 (1972), and Bertha Pappe-eim: Addenda to her Case History, Ibid., 
21, 328-332 (1973); and more-generally, S. REICHARD, A Re-examination of "Studies 
on H~steria", Psyckoanalytic Qmrtedy, 25, 155-177 (1956). 
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fortable about returning to the case. As Ellenberger notes, the case 
((radically differ[ed] from other cases of hysteria [reported] at that time, 
but [was] analogous to the great exemplary cases of magnetic illness in 
the first half of the nineteenth century, ... » The case of Anna O. seems to 
have appeared to be a reversion to an earlier and ostensibly pre- 
scientific psychology. As Ellenberger reports, 
To the older magnetizers, Anna O.'s story would not have seemed as 
extaordinary as it did to Breuer. It was one of those cases, so frequent in 
the 1 8201s, yet so scarce in the 1880's, in which the patient dictated to the 
physician the therapeutic devices he had to use, prophesied the couqse of 
the iiiness, and announced its terminal date. But in 1880, when authori- 
tarian use of hypnosis had supplanted the former bargaining therapy, a 
story such as that of Anna O. could no longer be understood (8). 
The anxiety of the two authors, therefore, must have been based on the 
kind and quality of case study they were reporting, and not only on the 
fact of reporting case studies. Case studies were common enough in 
medicine and neurology at the time. Just two years befores publishing 
Studies on Hystiera, Freud had published a conventional case history 
illustrating how effective hipnotism could be in clearing up symptoms in 
a case of hysteria (9). This was quite unproblematic since the case 
merely illustrated a relatively common medical procedure and appeared 
to validate a theory. In Studies on Hysteria, however, Freud and Breuer 
were admitting the lack of medical and physiological authority over 
hysteria and, by implication, attributing to the patients the knowledge 
and power to cure themselves. As Freud noted, their cases also had 
more of a literary than a scientific character (10). And that, taken in 
conjunction with the fact that Freud and Breuer were using their cases to 
illustrate yet non-existent theory, was what made Studies on Hysteria an 
anomalous book on an anomalous subject. 
Of course Studies on Hysteria consisted of more than merely case 
studies. The first chapter was a paper that Freud and Breuer had 
previously. published, a ((Preliminary Communication)) on hysteria, defi- 
(8) ELLENBERGER, H. (1970), op. cit., p. 484. This gives iníeresting relevance to a remark 
of Robert Darnton in his book, Mesmerism and the End of the Enlightenment in Frunce, 
Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, p. 173: «Works by nonmesmerists usudly 
honor Mesmer as a misunderstood and sometimes heroic prophet of modern psycho- 
logy. It may be that psychoanalysis developed from a line of occult scientists, linking 
Freud, Charcot, and Braid with Bertrand, Puysegur, and Mesmer, just as chemistry 
emerged from alchemy.)) 
(9) A Case of a successful Treaunent by Hypnosis in: STRACHEY, J. et. al. (eds.) (1966), 
Standard Edition, vol. 1 ,  London, Hogarth, pp. 1 15-128. 
(10) See below, p. 27 1. 
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ning their place on the frontier of research and distinguishing their 
approach from that of other investigators. And the book concluded with 
a ((Theoretical)) chapter by Breuer and a paper on catharsis as the 
essential ingredient of (tl'he Psychotherapy of Hysteria)) by Freud. Thus 
the two authors carefully bracketed their detailed case studies by 
theoreticd statements, giving their case studies the formal appearance 
of mere illustrations. But. this was an obligatory formality dictated by the 
norrns of scientific reporting, norms to which Breuer and Freud 
naturally subscribed. Nevertheless, the theoretical portions of Studies on 
Hysteria were the profoundly tentative portions and the case studies the 
real substance of it. OnXy in the case studies could the authors speak 
comfortably in the indicative mood -only there were they really sure of 
their ground. And there were good reasons for this, that Freud at least 
recognized. 
In his discussion of the case of Frau Emmy von N., also published in 
Studies ofHysteria, Freud noted the difficulties arising from the fact that 
hysteria was a diagnostic category without rigorous or commonly 
accepted definition: «UnXess we have first come to a complete agreement 
upon the terminology involved, it is not easy to decide whether a 
particular case is to be reckoned as a hysteria or some other neurosis.)) 
Of course the fact that hysteria was a poorly understood but notorious 
class of nervous disorders is precisely what interested Freud. One might 
say that hysteria was an acknowledged category of anomalous mental 
disorders in the 1890's. Anyone who could understand and define the 
nature of this disorder would clear up many mysteries in neuropa- 
thology. As Freud put it, «we have still to await the directing hand which 
shall set up boundary rnarks in the region of the commonly occurring 
neuroses and which shall bring out the features essential for characte- 
rization.)) In the meantime, however, (we are still accustomed to 
diagnosing a hysteria, ... from its similarity to familiar typical cases.)) 
Thus Freud explained the necessity of reporting case studies to himself 
by remembering that hysteria was not then a well understood disease, 
but anticipated that sonie great scientist -and in the very fact of his 
writing upon the subject we can see that he already anticipated the 
possibility that he might be that ((directing hand»- would clear up the 
confusion by defining the distinctive features of hysteria. Then hysteria 
would come in under the umbrella of medical science and case studies 
would no longer be necessary (1 1). 
(1 1) Standard Edition, vol. 2,  p. 85. We also note that Freud expreses the germ of an idea of (tscientific revolutions)) in this passage. 
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In another passage in Studies on Hysteria Freud explicitly stated his 
anxiety as a neuropathologist writing case studies. At the beginning of 
his discussion of the case of Fraulein Elisabeth von R., he confessed, 
1 have not always been a psychotheraiist. Like other neuropathologists, 1 
was trained to employ local diagnoses and electro-prognosis, and it still 
strikes me myself as strange that the case histories 1 write should read like 
short stories and that, as one might say, they lack the serious stamp ofscience. 1 
must console myself with the reflection that the nature of the subject is 
evidently responsible for this, rather than any preference of my own. The 
fact is that local diagnosis and electrical reactions lead nowhere in the 
study of hysteria, whereas a detailed description of mental processes such 
as we are accustomed to find in the works of imaginative writers enables 
me, with the use of a few psychological formulas, to obtain at least some 
kind of insight into the course of that affection. Case histories of this kind 
are intended to be judged like psychiatric ones; they have, however, one 
advantage over the latter, narnely an intimate connection between the 
story of the patient's sufferings and the symptoms of his illness -a 
connection for which we still search in vain in the biographies of other 
psychoses (12). 
This passage speaks very much for itself and illustrates again what 1 have 
tried to suggest about the anxiety the authors of Studies on Hysteria had to 
confront. But it also reveals a characteristic of Freud's scientific mind 
that would enable him to press on with the solution of the problem of 
hysteria, while Breuer would withdraw from the controversia1 enter- 
prise. Freud was able to express his anxiety about the disjuncthn of the 
expectations of the scientific community on the one hand and what he 
was doing on the other, and explain to himself and his readers that the 
path he was breaking in method by narrating his cases was appropriate 
to the peculiar nature of the pathology he was investigating. To the 
objections that he expected his contemporaries would make to his 
procedure he found answers, and even comparative advantages. 
This may have been only a moment of bravado in 1895, however, 
since Freud was still far from his mature understanding of hysteria or 
the ((talking cure)) that Anna 0. had invented in her conversations with 
Breuer. But if it was bravado, it was facilitated by the fact that Freud had 
as yet no idea how complicated his reports of case studies would become 
by the time when, two decades later, he was to write his report on the 
case of the Wolf Man. Here he states easily that he had aendeavoured to 
weave the explanations which 1 have been able to give of the case into 
my description of the course on her [Fraulein Elisabeth von R.'s] 
(12) Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 160-161. 
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recovery)) (13). In fact the cases reported in Studies on Hysteria do read 
rather easily and the narrative is straightfonvard, not unlike, 1 am 
tempted to suggest in eclho of Freud, the naturalistic narrative common 
in fiction in the late nineteenth century. In style too, Studies on Hysteria 
constitute both a reversion to the early nineteenth century and a 
harbinger of the twentieth. As Wolf Lepenies shows, when psychology 
was redefined as a physiological and medical science, around 1830 on 
the European continent, literary style become an embarrassment to 
psychologists and they apparently felt obliged to repudiate the impor- 
tant tradition of elegant descriptive investigation in which psychopa- 
thological states had therefore been made empathically plausible. 
Thereafter, novelistic descriptions of psychology and psychopathology 
such as those of Balzac were no longer considered relevant to the science 
of psychology. It was left to Freud, in his careful description of 
individual cases, to reintroduce literary style as a tool of investigation in 
psychology ( 1  4). Intimately connected to his abdication of medical 
authority over hysteria, Chis too was a source of anxiety to Freud. Freud's 
investigations would eventually become one of the principal stimuli of 
radically different and extremely intricate narrative styles, as is com- 
monly known ( 1  5). The simplicity of his narratives in Studies on Hysteria is 
however, a measure of his naiveté vis 6 vis the problem of hysteria and 
the genre of case studies. For instead of progressively resolving them- 
selves into scientifically acceptable theories as Freud carne to unders- 
tand hysteria better, his case studies were to become more and more 
complex and entangled narratives. But they would remain an indepen- 
dent genre of psychoandytic investigation. 
11. THE DORA CASE 
Freud did not write another case study until after he had published 
7h.e Interpretation ofDreams at the turn of the century. But when he did, it 
(13) Zbtd., vol. 2, pp. 161. 
(14) Wolf Lepenies, Transjonnattt and Storage of Sczenttfit Tradttzons zn Lzterature, unpublished 
manuscript cited by courtesy of the author, 1980. The following passage from ELLEN- 
BERGER, H. (1970), op. czt., p. 474, is also relevant: «One is free to speculate about the 
literary possibilities ha! Freud left medicine to develop his great talent as awriter. Emmy 
von N., Elisabeth von R., and young Dorawould have become heroines in short stories. 
The obsessions of the Wolf-Man would have been made a nightmarish novel in 
Hoffmann's fashion, and a story about Leonardo da Vinci would have overshadowed 
Merezhkovsky's historicd fiction. A novel by Freud about the cruel old father and the 
horde would have brougtit to perfection that literary genre of prehistoric novels that the 
brothers Rosny had made popular in France, although Freud would have conceived it 
more in the style of Hesse's Rainmaker. The story of Moses ... » and so on. 
(15) See for example, BROOIKS, P. (1979), Fictions of the Wolf Man: Freud and Narrative 
Undystanding, Dzacntzcs, 9, 72-81. 
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was the seminal Fragment ofa Analysis of a Case ofHystem'a (1 905), written in 
190 1 but not published until four years later. In his three volume Life 
and Works ofsigmund Freud, Ernest Jones wrote that this case, commonly 
referred to as the Dora case, ((has served for years as a model for students 
of psychoanalysis)) (1 6). We may add that it has enjoyed notoriety among 
critics of Freud for nearly as long. And it was a case in which Freud failed 
to achieve his therapeutic ends, a fact that may cause us to wonder why 
he chose to publish it at all. Dora left Freud after only three months in 
analysis. Her departure surprised him and caused him to devote a great 
deal of thinking to an explanation of what had gone wrong. He wrote 
and eventually published the case for at least two reason. First, the case 
turned largely upon two dreams. Since The Interpretation of Dreams had 
been published so recently, he was naturally inclined to take advantage 
of the opportunity to illustrate «how an art, which would othenvise be 
useless, can be turned to account for the discovery of hidden and 
repressed parts of mental life)). Second, he wanted to show how the 
general therapeutic method he had outlined in the final chapter of 
Studies on Hystem'a had led him to a far more sophisticated understanding 
of that anomalous disease of the mind than any other investigator had 
achieved. Not only was the case a therapeutic failure; Freud's interest in 
the case and motives for publishing it were extra-therapeutic. After Dora 
quit psychoanalysis, she became an even more interesting subject of 
research. Freud could hardly resist the opportunity Dora afforded him 
to display the method he had devised for the analysis of hysteria and the 
insight it yielded in this particular case (1 7) .  
Freud managed to convince himself that the difficulties inhering in 
this (therapeutically) unresolved case suited it to become ((a first 
introductory publication)) on the question of hysteria. Oddly enough, 
that is .precisely how it has been read by several generations of 
psychoanalysts. Using a still very rudimentary notion of ((transference)), 
Freud argued that it was because he had failed to «master» or dispell the 
(16) JONES, E (1955), The Life and Work ofsigmund Freud, New York, Basic Books, vol. 2, p. 257. 
Some of the most interesting things on the Dora case have been written by non- 
psychoanaiysts. See for example, Steven Marcus's long essay, Freud and Dora: Story, 
History, Case History, in his Representations: Essays on Literature and Sociep, New York, 
Random House, pp. 247-310 (1975). There is aiso a very interesting historicai recons- 
truction of Dora's identity in an unpublished essay by Peter Loewenberg, ((Austro- 
Marxism and Revolution: Otto Bauer, Freud's Dora Case, and the Crisis of the Fiist 
Austrian Republic)), to appear as part of a forthcoming book. 
(1 7) Standard Edition, London, Hogarth, vol. 7, pp. 114-1 15 (1953). For a futher statement on 
how Dora illustrated the technique described in The Interpretation ofDreams, see pp. 10-1 1 
of the same volume. 
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transference that Dora liad formed with respect to him that their 
therapeutic encduri'ter was so short-lived. He felt that he had been 
distracted by thereadiness with which Dora put considerable quantities 
of pathological material at his disposal. He had been unaware of the fact 
that the transference haclalready developed to shield another portion of 
her pathology. Had he been aware of this he might have explained the 
matter t~ Dora and tbeir interpretations might have proceeded to the 
eventual resolution of her difficulties. As it was, he had the considerable 
materials of her two rich dreams and he also had her dramatic departure 
as an illustration of the transference as well as grounds for inferring what 
additional materials the transference has masked. This enabled him to 
write a rather extensive and illuminating report (18). 
Freud was consequently unconcerned about the brevity and incom- 
pleteness of his therapy with Dora, but two other kinds of incomple- 
teness did give him pause when he considered publishing his written 
report. First, since he wanted to focus upon hysteria rather than his 
interpretive technique, he had not reported «the process of interpre- 
tation to which the patient's associations and communications had been 
subjected, but only the results of that process)) (19). And second, he 
explicitly reaffirmed the credo of the science of his day by stating that «a 
single case history, even if it were complete and open to no doubt, 
cannot provide the answer to al1 the questions arising out of the 
problem of hysteria)) (20). We may profitably reflect upon each of these 
additional senses of incompleteness in the account of Dora's case, for 
both of these questions had concerned Freud writing Studies on Hysteria 
and would occupy his attention in later case studies too. One of the 
problems may be called {:he question of rhetorical strategy in reporting a 
case and the other the question of the scientific status of Freud's 
observations of a case. 
The dubious ((objectivity)) of his observations was prominent in 
' Freud's mind when he wrote his account of Dora's hysteria. On the first 
page, having alluded to liis earlier publications on the disease, he noted 
that it had been ((awkward that 1 was obliged to publish the results of my 
inquiries without there being any possibility of other specialists testing 
and checking them)) and that it was ((scarcely less awkward now» (21). He 
attempted to forestal1 criticism on this score by going on at considerable 
length about the pruricence of his contemporaries, even physicians, 
- 
(18) Ibid, vol. 7 ,  pp. 116-120. 
(19) Ibid., vol. 7 ,  pp. 12-13 and again on p. 1 12. 
(20) Ibid., vol. 7 ,  p. 13. 
(21) Ibid., vol. 7 ,  p. 7 .  
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which did not permit identifjing the subject of his case report. This may 
have been an accurate account of the state of affairs then, but it was 
unrealistic for Freud to think that circumstances would ever permit 
disclosure of the identity of such a patient. Confidentiality was in fact a 
feature of medical ethics generally, and only the special nature of, the 
materials under investigation in Freud's work made this problematic. 
We must, therefore, look beyond the prurience of Freud's readers, into 
the nature of psychoanalytic knowledge itself, as indeed Freud did, if we. 
are to appreciate the special problems of intersubjectivity presented by 
psychoanalysis. 
Freud made two other observations suggesting that the material he 
was presenting in his study of Dora could not be appreciated by readers 
unfamiliar with his earlier work. Pointing out that his analysis of Dora 
was largely an interpretation of two dreams, he said he expected his 
readers to study The Intepretation of Dreams before undertaking to read 
his Fragment ofan Analysis ofa Case ofHysteria. For although it was true that 
no other observer could check the veracity of his report of Dora's 
drearns, the general principles of dream interpretation were accesible 
to every reader in his earlier book, and ((everyone can submit his own 
dreams to analytic examination)) (22). This, as we know, was quite a 
request to make of his readers. It was tantamount to suggesting that his 
readers undergo psychoanalysis, or what is even more difficult, self- 
analysis, before they read his account of Dora's analysis. In another 
passage, Freud suggested that even familiarity with the ideas in The 
Interpretation ofDreams was not enough -one must agree with them in 
order to appreciate his case study of Dora: ((Anyone who has hitherto 
been unwilling to believe that a psycho-sexual aetiology holds good 
generally and without exception for hysteria is scarcely likely to be 
convinced of the fact by taking stock of a single case history. He would 
do better to suspend his judgment until his own work has earned him 
the right to be convinced)) (23). Here Freud links the problem of Dora's 
being a single case with the difficulty of checking his observations and 
suggests that these obstacles to the intersubjectivity of his insights could 
be overcome if the reader were sufficiently initiated into psychoanlysis. 
He does not, however, go beyond the implication that psychoanlysis is a 
specialized branch of knowledge that cannot be appreciated immedia- 
tely by a novice, something that can be said about almost any scientific 
(22) Ibid., vol. 7, pp. 10-11. Again in the same passage Freud asserts that «since ... this case 
history presupposes a knowledge of the interpretation of dreams, it will seem highly 
unsatisfactory to any reader to whom this presupposition does not apply)). 
(23) Ibid., vol. 7,  p. 13. 
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discipline. Later he would ackowledge that psychoanalytic knowledge 
had its own peculiar difficulties intimately related to its unique value. 
While we are considering Freud's anticipation of difficulties with 
unreceptive readers, it may be well to recall how the case of Dora struck 
readers who were positively inclined to psychoanalysis. It was Ernest 
Jones's initial encounter with Freud's work and when he wrote his 
biography of Freud he had this to say about it. 
This first case history of Freud's has for years served as a model for 
students of psychoanalysis, and although our knowledge has greatly 
progressed since then, it makes today as interesting reading as ever. It was 
the first of Freud's post-neurological writings 1 had come across, at the 
time of its publication, and 1 well remember the deep impression the 
intuition and the close attention to detail displayed in it made on me. 
Here was a man who not only listened closely to every word his patient 
spoke but regarded each such utterance as every whit as definite and as in 
need of correlation as the phenomena of the physical world. At the 
present day it is hard to convey what an amazing event it was for anyone 
to take the data of psychology so seriously. Yet that it should less than half 
a century after seem a commonplace is a measure of the revolution 
effected by one man (24). 
This seems to suggest that difficulties of intersubjectivity inherent in 
Freud's case studies when seen from the view-point of positivistic 
philosophy of science were positive advantages when these studies were 
read by someone favorably disposed to Freud's ideas and intuitions. 
Jone's remarks reflect equally on the other reservation Freud had 
about the difficulty of presenting case studies: the rhetorical strategy that 
he was forced to adopt. Here again his ideas had advanced some since 
his work with Breuer. Although in writing Studies on Hysteria he had been 
distressed by the fact that he wrote something like short stories on the 
course of each patient's illness, he nonetheless managed to make them 
into vigorous and illuminating narratives. But in his Fragment o f  un 
Analysis ofa Case ofHysteria -already an awkward title- Freud professed 
surprise that other scientific writers ((can produce such smooth and 
exact histories in cases of hysteria)). He had observed that «the patients 
are incapable of giving such reports about themselves)). Furthermore, 
according to Freud's riew view of the matter, their incapacity to give 
such reports is an integral part of their illnesses: the repression of 
memories and the expression in the form of syrnptoms of the conflicts 
associated with these memories that constitutes hysteria precludes the 
(24) JONES, E. (1 955), The l.@ and Work of Sigmund Freud, New York, Basic Books, vol. 2, 
p. 257. 
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possibility of an orderly recounting of a patient's life (25). Furthermore, 
Freud recognized that there were several stories to be told that could 
hardly be told simultaneously. In the Dora case he distinguished only 
between the narration of his interpretive technique and the reconstrvc- 
ted biographic story in which the patient's pathology had developed. 
But he no longer felt that he could weave these stories together as he had 
in Studies on Hysteria. 
i have in this paper left entirely out of account the technique, which does 
not at al1 follow as a matter of course, but by whose means done the pure 
metal of valuable unconscious thoughts can be extracted from the raw 
material of the patient's associations. This brings with it the disadvantage 
of the reader being given no opportunity of testing the correctness of my 
procedure in the course of this exposition of the case. 1 found it quite 
impracticable, however, to deal simultaneously with the technique of 
analysis and with the internal stmcture of a case of hysteria: 1 could 
scarcely have accomplished such a task, and if 1 had, the result would 
have been almost unreadable (26). 
Freud had learned a great dela about the epistemological status of 
the knowledge he was deriving from hysterical patients in the years since 
1895. Paradoxically, what he had learned made him both more and less 
sanguine about the prospects of communicating this knowledge. He was 
much more aware of'the difficulties of demonstrating the validity of his 
observations and hypotheses to the medical world at large, but he had 
begun to see that other initiates and especially practitioners of psychoa- 
nalysis were in a peculiarly advantageous position to appreciate his case 
studies. Ernest Jones writes that we do not know why Freud hesitated so 
long to publish the Dora case, and strictly speaking that is true, but the 
way his thinking had changed since 1895 suggests a very strong reason. 
He simply,took his reservations about the case's incompleteness very 
seriously. And in view of the still almost complete lack of a psychoana- 
lytic community in 1901, it is no wonder that he did not publish it then. 
In 1905 things looked different and the illustrative value the case held 
for other psychoanalysts outweighed his reservations about the possi- 
bility of its being appreciated by the uninitiated. 
(25) Standard Edition, vol. 7 ,  pp. 16-18. 
(26) Ibid., vol. 7,  pp. 12-13 and 112. Cited passage appears on p. 112. On p. 13, Freud writes 
that «Apart from the dreams, therefore, the technique of the analytic work has been 
revealed in only a very few places. My object in this case history was to demonstrate the 
intimate srructure of a neurotic disorder and the determination of its symptoms; and it 
would have led to nothing but hopeless confusion if 1 had tried to complete the other 
task at the same time.» This is an even more explicit recognition of the impossibility of 
reconciling the naturalistic narrative with the work of anaiysis. 
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Anyone seeking to understand what psychoanalytic knowledge is 
should try to understand Freud's dilemma at this juncture. 1 believe that 
if we cannot appreciatt: Freud's motives in considering whether to 
publish the Dora case, we may be reasonably sure that we do not 
understand the way in which psychoanalytic knowledge developed and 
how it is constituted. 
111. LITTIE HANS AND THE RAT MAN 
When Freud finally decided to publish his account of Dora's case it 
was after four years of temporizingj as 1 have already pointed out. In 
fact, the paper had beeri accepted for publication as early as January, 
190 1 by Ziehen, the editor of the Monatschrift für Psychiatrie und Neurologie, 
the same journal in which it actually appeared in 1905 (27). But this was 
the last of Freud's. case studies that was to appear in a medical journal 
not directly associated with the psychoanalytic movement. (Jones notes 
that Freud gave his last lecture before a medical audience in 1904.) Of 
course in 1900 when Freud worked with Dora and wrote the history of 
her case, he couldn't be expected to have had disciples or a journal 
devoted e~rclusively to psychoanalysis. It was only in late 1902 and 1903 
that the first meetings of what was to become the Vienna Psychoanalytic 
Society were held in Freud's waiting room, and only in 1908 that the first 
((internationa.1)) meeting of psychoanalysts was held in Salzburg. It was at 
the Salzburg meeting that the decision was made to publish a psychoa- 
nalytic periodical (28). As one might suppose, the Jahrbuch was founded 
in order to give the group its own forum in which to further develop 
psychoanalysis without the interference of the uninitiated -a step taken 
by the practitioners of virtually every emergent discipline or subdisci- 
pline (29). Thus in 1909 Freud was able to publish his next two case 
histories in the first two numbers of the first psychoanalytic periodical, 
the Jahrbuch fUr psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen. These 
were his reports on the cases commonly known as Little Hans, Analysis of 
a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Bay, and the Rat Man, Notes upon a Case of 
Obsessional Neurosis. In view of the circumstances in which they were 
(27) See the ((Editors Note)), Standard Edition, London, Hogarth, vol. 7 ,  pp. 3-5 (1953). 
(28) See JONES, E. (1955), The Life and Work off-igmund Freud, vol 2, pp. 38-45. 
(29) See also Jung's prefatory statement in the first volume, and Jone's account of Freud's 
letter in which he expressed satisfaction at being rid of outside interference and able to 
communicate with his disciples in their own publication, ibid., p. 45. It is significant that 
this important step in creating a disciplinary matrix should have been marked on 
Freud's part by the contribution of two case studies (and no other communications) to 
the first volume of the Jahrbuch. 
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published, it should come as no surprise that Freud's accounts of these 
two cases should be devoid of that defensive sensitivity vis 6 vis non- 
psychoanalytic readers which marked his account of the Dora case. The 
cases published in 1909 were clearly aimed at a readership of psychoa- 
nalysts, a readership which had only emerged in the time since the 
writing of the Dora case (30). 
The case of Little Hans especially gives the impression of a contri- 
bution entre nous, and it became the very first item in the first issue of the 
Jahrbuch. The sense of familiarity derives in part, of course, from the fact 
that the raw materials for the report were supplied by the little boy's 
parents, who were, according to Freud, ((among my closest adhe- 
rents)) (3 1). According to Freud, too, he had «for many years been urging 
my pupils and my friends to collect observations of the sexual life of 
children)) in order to compare the data of such observations to hypo- 
theses about early sexual life derived from the analysis of adults, e.g., 
those that he had published in the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality 
(1905). The case of Little Hans is the most obvious fmit of this request, 
something the parents of the child shared with Freud, and which Freud 
then shared with his other disciples. But there were important and 
positive theoretical reasons for sharing this case with psychoanalysts. 
Freud acknowledged that the hypotheses in the Three Essays, 
seem as strange to an outside reader as they seem incontrovertible to a 
psycho-analyst. But even a psycho-analyst may confess to the wish for a 
more direct and less roundabout proof of these fundamental theorems. 
Surely there must be a possibility of observing in children at first hand 
and in al1 the freshness of life the sexual impulsed and wishes which we 
dig out so laboriously in adults from among their own débris -especially 
as it is also our belief that they are the common property of al1 men, a part 
of the human constitution, and merely exaggerated or distorted in the 
case of neurotics (32). 
Here we see that Freud continued to regard the case study as somewhat 
inferior in significance to theoretical formulations, but accorded it an 
irnportant role in the confirmation of hypotheses, i.e., in the validation 
(30) The two cases constitute vol. 10 of the Standard Edition. 
(3 1) The father was Max Graf, a music critic and member of Freud's early circle who attended 
the ((Wednesday meetings)). 
It is interesting that this relatively simple case that Freud published for didactic reason 
done, and not because it illustrated any new complexities of technique or marked out 
any new territory of diagnosis, has been very little the subject of later psychoanaiytic 
investigation or writing. This would seem to confirm Freud's statements about the 
greater value of the cases on the frontiers of knowledge, even if they cannot be 
completely resolved, given in his account of the case of the Wolf Man. See below, p. 290. 
(32) Standard Edition, vol. 10, pp. 5-6. 
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process (33). It is also interesting to note that he seems no longer 
worried about the fact tlhat this is only one case. 
Working now in the context of what he was later to cal1 athe 
psychoanalytic movement)), Freud discovered another use for the case 
history -the pedagogical. In his conclusion to the Analysis ofa Phobia in a 
Rve-Year Old Boy he wrote that, 
Strictly speaking, 1 learnt nothing new from this analysis, nothing that 1 
had not already been able to discover (though often less distinctly and 
more indirectly) from other patients analysed at a more advanced age. 
But the neuroses of these other patients could in every instance be traced 
back to the same infantile complexes that were revealed behind Hans's 
phobia. 1 arn therefore tempted to claim for this neurosis of childhood 
the significance of being a type and a model, ... (34). 
This is a particularly initeresting passage, in view of the tremendous 
irnportance that case studies, and particularly Freud's case studies, have 
occupied in the curriculum of the psychoanalytic institutes. The account 
of Little Hans's phobia and its removal constitutes the first psychoana- 
lytic case study written largely for didactic reasons (35). Of course Freud 
had called his account of Dora's analysis ((suitable as a first introductory 
publication)), but with the scientific reading public at large in mind. In 
the case of Dora Freud wanted to demonstrate his understanding of 
hysteria; in that of Little Mans he wanted to show psychoanalysts how 
psychoandysis proceeds and that the sexual aetiology of adult neuroses 
could be confirmed in the analysis of a child. The different audience that 
Freud envisioned is crucial to the evolution of his thinking about the 
value of his case studies. 
Freud's report on his analysis of the Rat Man, Notes upon a Case o f  
Obsessional Neurosis, confirms this impression about the intended rea- 
dership to which Freud now directed his case studies (36). The case of 
(33) C t  JONES, E. (1955), The Life and Work ofSigmund Freud, vol. 2, pp. 258-262. 
(34) Standard Edition, vol. 10, p. 147. 
(35) It was also the first child arialysis, a practice later developed along slightly different lines 
by Melanie Klein. See her Psychoanalysis of Childra (London, Hogarth, 1932) and 
especidy her Narrative of a Child Analysts (London, Hogart). 
(36) The post-Freudian psycheoanalytic literature on the case of the Rat Man is abundant. See 
KANZER, M. (1952), The Transference Neurosis of the Rat Man, Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 
21, 181-189; ZETZEL, E. 11. (1966), 1965: Additional Note upon a Case of obsessional 
Neurosis: Freud 1909, InternationalJournal ofPsycho-Analysis, 47, 123-129; MEYERSON, P. 
G. (1966), Comments on Dr. Zetz~l's Paper, ibid., pp. 139-142; LIPTON, S. D. (1971), 
Freud's Analysis of the Rat Man considered as a technical Paradigm, abstracted in Builetin 
ofthe Philadeiphia Associationfor Psychoanalysis, 21, 179- 183; CEDO, J. E.; GOLDBERG, A. 
(1973), Models ofthe Mind, pp. 11 1-1 14; and BEIGIER, J. S. (1975), A Commentary on 
Freud's Treatment of the Ilat Man, The Annual ofPsychoanalysis, 3, 27 1-286. 
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the Rat Man is less an illustration of a theoretical hypothesis than the 
case of Little Hans, and more an attempt to explore new ground, but it 
is therefore even more directly oriented to the psychoanalytic readership 
of the Jahrbuch. In noting the incompleteness of his account of the case, 
Freud explained that he had «not yet succeeeded in completely pene- 
trating the complicated texture of a severe case of obsessional neurosis)). 
Furthermore, Freud noted that obsessional neuroses were far less easy 
to understand than cases of hysteria. This was paradoxical, since 
obsessional neuroses constitute not only «a dialect of the language of 
hysteria)), but ((a dialect in which we ought to be able to find our way 
about more easily, since it is more nearly related to the forms of 
expression adopted by our conscious thought than is the language of 
hysteria)). He suggested that the difficulty was due to the fact that fewer 
cases of obsessional neurosis had presented themselves for analysis, 
such neurotics finding it possible to ((dissimulate their condition in daily 
life)). In any case, obsessional neuroses constituted a pathology on the 
frontier of psychoanalysis, 'much like hysteria had been an anomaly in 
neuropathology when Freud began to study it. This is what made Freud 
feel justified in communicating his insights to the psychoanalytic 
community. 
In these circumstances there is no alternative but to report the facts in the 
imperfect and incomplete fashion in which they are known and in which 
it is leeitimate to communicate them. The crumbs of knowle~de offered 
" " 
in these pages, though they have been laboriously enough collected, may 
not in themselves prove very satis5ing; but they may serve as a starting- 
point for the work of other investigators, and common endeavour may 
bring the success which is perhaps beyond the reach of individual 
effort (37). 
With this 1 believe we begin to see another pattern in Freud's thinking 
about his case studies: they are exemplary investigations, not necessarily 
solutions, to problems of psychopathology. He now thought of his case 
studies as parts of a scientific research literature to which other psychoa- 
nalysts would obviously contribute. Even his imperfect and incomplete 
case studies served to mark out the territory of future psychoanalytic 
investigations. 
In his conclusion to the sarne case, he expressed his wish that 
(([allthough my communication is incomplete in every sense, it may at 
least stimulate other workers to throw more light upon the obsessional 
neurosis by a deeper investigation of the subject)). Freud may have been 
given to false modesty on occasion, but this is not one of those 
(37) Standard Edition, vol. 10, pp. 156-157. 
Freud's Case Studies and the Locus of Psychoanalytic Knowledge 283 
occasions. He was concerned here with the very difficult problem of 
demarcating obsessional neuroses from cases of hysteria, as we see from 
the same passage where he also states very vaguely that «What is 
characteristic of this neurosis -what differentiates it from hysteria- is 
not, in my opinion, to be found in instinctual life but in the psycholo- 
gical field)) (38). This postulate remained to be further specified by other 
workers who would analyze cases of obsessional neurosis. Thus we see 
that Freud's diminished anxiety about the incompleteness of his cases 
and his confidence in the cooperation of his psychoanalytic followers go 
hand in hand. The case history had by this time achieved the status of a 
genre peculiarly suited to communication among psychoanalysts. Freud 
clearly saw both of his cases published in 1909 as a part of a ongoing 
process of psychoanalytic resebch. They were not merely places where 
acquired insight and knlowledge could be deposited (for the benefit of 
the world at large), buu a genre which fomented further research by 
investigators who had already gained ..a conviction of the value of 
psychoanalysis. 
Freud said little enough about the transference in these two case 
studies piiblished in 1909, but that may be precisely because these are 
cases written for psychoanalysts and psychoanalysts understood this 
matter by then. There is good evidence in remarks he made for non- 
psychoanalysts on the subject of transference in the sarne year, that he 
believed that experience in analysis was a prerequisite for the appre- 
ciation of the validity of insights derived from psychoanalysis. In his Five 
Lectures on Psychoanalysis given at Clark University in 1909, Freud stressed 
that the experience of ti-ansference 
plays a decisive part in bringing conviction not only to the patient but also 
to the physician. 1 know it to be true of al1 my followers that they were 
only convinced of the correctness of my assertions on the pathogenesis 
of the neuroses by their experiences with transference; and 1 can very well 
imderstand that such certainty of judgement cannot be attained before 
one has carried out psycho-analyses and has oneself observed the 
workings of transference (39). 
This conviction that his followers had verified the value of his insights by 
their own experience with the transferences of their own patients must 
be seen as an important part of the basis of his new attitude about case 
studies. 
The experience of transference that Freud now began to presuppose 
in the readers of his case studies can be viewed with extreme skepticism 
(38) Zbid., vol. 10, p. 248. Cf: JQNES, E. (1955), The Life and Work ofSigmund Freud, vol. 2, p. 264. 
(39) Zbid., vol. 1 1 ,  pp. 51-52. 
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or it can be casually accepted as specialized training. It can be viewed as 
no more than the psychoanalytic analogue of the prerequisite training 
presupposed in the scientific reports of every other specialized disci- 
pline, from psychics to statistical demography. Or, experience with the 
transference in the prospective psychoanalyst's own analysis and in the 
supervized analysis of his first patients can be taken as a rite of initiation 
bound to produce believers and thus a highly unscientific community of 
investigators. It seems to me that there is at least a modicum of truth in 
both of these positions, and futhermore, that there is little prospect of 
resolving the issue to the satisfaction of al1 those who adopt the opposed 
attitudes. This much must be admitted. In fact, the two positions form 
the parameters that give rise to the question of psychoanalytic know- 
ledge. For if psychoanalytic training, analysis, etc., is both scientific 
training and religious rite of initiation, then psychoanalysis is neither 
simply science nor religious pseudo-science. 
What strikes me as more interesting, however, is that this experience 
with the transference in the analytic situation that Freud prescribed 
might be the complement of the case studies in defining the peculiar 
nature of psychoanalytic knowledge. For 1 began by noting that psy- 
choanalitic knowlegde seemed anomalous in being located in case 
studies. Now in the process of demonstrating the evolution of Freud's 
own thinking toward this view, we have discovered that experience with 
the transference is a prerequisite to understanding the cases Freud 
reported. The transference seems to be the particular kind of ((personal 
knowledge)) required of the psychoanalyst. But unlike the many exam- 
ples of personal knowledge given by Polanyi in his book by that name, 
the transference is only useful when the psychoanalyst is acutely 
conscious of it. Unlike the many skills that we learn without being able 
to describe them adequately or explain them theoretically, and by 
definition unlike tacit knowledge, transference is a kind of knowledge 
that depends upon the psychoanalyst's ability to articulate it. Thus it 
may be that the transference is more thoroughly ((personal knowledge)) 
than the skills that other scientists learn by empathy and imitation from 
their teachers. It seems to constitute a form of intersubjectivity that can 
only be defined as articulated ((implicity)), or, in psychoanalytic terms, 
the unconscious made conscious. This would seem to be what makes it 
both highly subjective and yet a shared medium of communication that 
constitutes the basis of the psychoanalytic community of investigation. 
IV. THE SCHREBER CASE 
Freud's analysis of Daniel Paul Schreber's delusion was published in 
the Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen in 19 1 1. 
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This essay, Psychoanalytic Notes on un Autobiographical Account o f  a Case of 
Paranoia, is not a case study in the same sense as the others i am 
considering here, inasmiich as Freud had no personal contact with 
Schreber, nor did Schreber himself have any experience with psychoa- 
nalytic therapy (as even Little Hans had). Schreber had, however, written 
an elaborate account of his mental illness, and published it as his 
Memoirs ofa Mental Patient (40). Freud used these published memoirs as 
the basis of his analysis. Nonetheless, the case is again presented 
primarily to psychoanalysts rather than to the medical world at large. 
Thus we may note that by this time Freud's thinking on his case studies 
had progressed so far that he made no rhetorical use of the fact that the 
patient's autobiographicd account was in the public domain. He might 
have argued that this would give his analysis an objectivity that his 
earlier case studies did not possess, opening it to the review of other 
professionals interested in paranoia. But he was no longer concerned in 
his case studies with establishing his greater capacity to deal therapeu- 
tically with a particular form of mental illness. He was still very much 
concerned that other psychoanalysts should read the case and assimilate 
his analysii; of it, however. In this respect, Freud's case history of 
Schreber bears some similarity to his treatment of Wilhelm Jensen's 
story ((Gradivm, which also verged upon becoming a case study of its 
author (41). 
Freud's most general aim in writing his acount of Schreber's illness 
was to establish the nature of paranoia and its location among other 
psychoanalytically understood mental disorders. As he had been at 
pains to distinguish obsessional neuroses from hysteria in his account of 
the analysis of the Rat Man, in his essay on Schreber Freud wanted to 
establish paranoia as a diagnostic category by penetrating to its defining 
features too (42). Al1 of this ought to remind us, 1 think, of his original 
anticipation in Studies on Hysteria, of «the directing hand which shall set 
up boundary marks)) among the various mental disorders. But the 
difficulties in the area of paranoia were particularly grievous and led to 
the fact that Freud was compelled to base his discussion of this disorder 
upon a written account rather than an analysis. People suffering from 
paranoid delusions were not apt to submit to psychoanalysis, a process 
(40) Denkwurdigkeiten eines Nenienkranken (Leipzig, Mutze, 1903), an English traslation was 
made by Ida Macalpine and Richard Hunter and published with an introduction as 
Memoirs of my Nenious Zllness (London, Dawson, 1955). 
(41) ((Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's Gradivm (1907), Standard Edition, vol. 9,  pp. 7-95. 
(42) On which, see chapter three of the essay, «On the Mechanism of Paranoia)), Standard 
Edition, vol. 12, pp. 59-79. 
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which would naturally elicit al1 their fears of persecution and cause them 
to ascribe the persecutions to the psychoanalyst. Having virtually no 
paranoid patients, therefore, and retaining those that he did encounter 
for only the very briefest periods, Freud found himself forced to fely 
upon the serendipitously published account of Schreber. Thus his 
apologies for the fact that under these circumstances he was not able to 
analyze the transferences .of the patient in the now well established 
analytic context (43). In view of al1 of these dificulties, it is al1 the more 
interesting and revealing that Freud should have chosen to convey his 
insights on paranoia in the form of a case history. 
The Schreber case seems to demonstrate the significance of case 
studies as the privileged genre of psychoanalytic knowledge in a negative 
way. Freud found it natural to make his arguments about paranoia in 
the context of this case study, even without transference, free association 
or even any personal contact with the subjetct, because no other mode 
of reporting constituted a plausible alternative. To be sure, the inclina- 
tion Freud obviously felt to anchor his thinking on paranoia in Schre- 
ber's memoirs may stem as much from the unusually florid nature of 
the pathology of this particular case as from the impossibility of giving a 
convincing account of paranoia in a more abstract mode. But whatever 
the mixture of motives, the incontestible fact is that Freud's report on 
the Shreber case has remained the cornerstone of psychoanalytic 
thinking on paranoia to this day (44). 
In his ((Attempts at Interpretation)), the second chapter of the essay 
on Schreber, Freud noted that his readers would ((only follow him as far 
as their own familiarity with analytic technique will allow them)) (45). But 
the case is a good illustration of how Freud's psychoanalytic colleagues 
did in fact follow him and by their own attention to Schreber's memoirs 
amplie the conclusions that could be drawn from a single case study. A 
year after his publication of the essay on Schreber, Freud noted that, 
By a happy chance the same issue of this periodical [the Jahrbuch] as that in 
which my own paper appeared showed that the attention of some other 
contributors had been directed to Schreber's autobiogaphy, and made it 
(43) Standard Edition, vol. 12, p. 9. 
(44) Of the enormous literature on the Schreber case, see especially the book by NIEDER- 
LAND, W. G. (1974), The Schreler Case psychoanalytic Profile of a Paranoid PersonaliQ, New 
York, Quadrangle, which contains good bibliographies of earlier work on Schreber. 
There was, for instance, a Symposium on the case, papers from which were published in 
the Znternational Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 44 (1963), edited by Philip M. Kitay. Other 
recent work on Schreber is represented by CEDO. J. E.; GOLDBERG, A. (1973), Models 
of the Mind, pp. 125-134; and MEISSNER, W. W. (1979), Schreber and the Paranoid 
Process, The Annual of Psychoanalysis, 7, 3-40. 
(45) Standard Edition, vol. 12, pp. 36-37. 
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easy to guess how much more material remains to be gathered from the 
symbolic content of the phantasies and delusions of this gifted para- 
noic (46). 
Of course Ernest Jones and other writers since him have suggested that 
Freud's remarks about paranoia in his account of the Schreber case 
sowed the seeds of the soon to be accomplished disassociation of Carl 
Jung and his followers from Freud, and the eventual disaffection of 
Sandor Fernczi (47). But so far from suggesting that Freud's essay failed 
in its role of exemplar to help maintain the coherence of the psychoa- 
nalytic community of investigation, this demonstrates the power of the 
case study to define the boundaries of the nascent discipline. Reading 
Freud's case studies, it seems, not only guided and educated Freud's 
willing followers, but could also serve to separate less orthodox analysts 
from the movement. In fact, Freud's next case study would be even 
more important in separating errant analysts. 
V. THE WOLF MAN 
Freud's analysis of the case of the Wolf Man, his last lengthy case 
study, was written in the winter of 19 14- 15, entitled From the History ofan 
Infantile Neurosis (1 91 8), and published in his Kleine Schriften, since the war 
had interri~pted the publication of the Jahrbuch for which it was inten- 
ded. It quite elaborately illustrates the fact that Freud had come to use 
his case studies to educate and influence the thinking of his fellow 
psychoanlysts rather than the medical world at large. In fact, Freud used 
the case of the Wolf Man to arbitrate his differences with Adler and 
especially with Jung. As he noted in regard to the context of his writing 
the case, 
At that time 1 was still freshly under the impression of the twisted re- 
interpretations which C .  G. Jung and Alfred Adler were endeavoring to 
give to the findings of psychoanlysis. This paper is therefore connected 
with my essay "On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement" which 
was published in the Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse in 1914. It supplements the 
polemic contained in that essay, which is in its essence of a personal 
character, by an objective estimation of the analytic material (48). 
It should not escape our notice that in linking this essay «On the History 
of the Psychoanalytic Movement)) to the case of the Wolf Man here, 
Freud calls the latter ((objective)) and implies that the former is more 
(46) Ibid., vol. 12, p. 80. 
(47) JONES, E. (1955), Tke Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, vol. 2, pp. 268-269. 
(48) Standard Edition, vol. 17, p. 7 .  
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subjective, in spite of the fact that it constitutes a much more thorough 
overview of the theoretical issues separating him from Jung and Adler. 
As 1 mentioned at the outset, the case study of the Wolf Man is 
Freud's most complicated and intricately argued case. It is interesting 
that he would use the case both to demonstrate his technique to his 
followers and to define the boundaries of psychoanalysis by showing 
how Jung and Adler had excluded themselves from the group of proper . 
practitioners. But this only further extends our appreciation of the 
degree to which he relied upon case studies to establish his ideas. The 
language used in this introductory passage confirms another impression 
we have drawn from earlier case studies, namely that Freud had ceased 
to worry about the lack of objectivity inherent in the genre and about the 
fact that cases were single instantes. The case as a whole, furthermore, 
contains some of Freud's most explicit statements on the value and 
significance of case studies. 
One of the central issues of Freud's account of the Wolf Man's 
infantile neurosis is closely related to a central theme of the Dora case: 
the importance of ((libidinal motive forces)) in psychopathology. At the 
same time, the difference in Freud's conception of his readers and his 
critics in the two cases illustrates how he thought psychoanalysis had 
progressed in establishing itself as an autonomous scientific discipline. 
People were content formerly to dispute the reality of the facts which are 
asserted by analysis; and for this purpose the best technique seemed to be 
to avoid examining them. That procedure appears to be slowly exhaus- 
ting itself; and people are now adopting another plan -of recognizing 
the facts, but of eleminating, by means of twisted interpretations, the 
consequences that foliow from them, so that the critics can still ward off 
the objectionable novelties as efficiently as ever. The study of childrenys 
neuroses exposes the complete inadequacy of these shallow or high- 
handed attempts at re-interpretation. It shows the predominant part that 
is played in the formation of neuroses by those libidinal motive forces 
which are so eagerly disavowed, and reveals the absence of any aspira- 
tions towards remote cultural aims, of which the child still knows nothing, 
and which cannot therefore be of any significance for him (49). 
The criticisms Freud had had to confront at the time he published the 
case of Dora were based on resistance to the very idea of infantile 
sexuality, in the medical profession and the population at large. The 
critics Freud had in mind in 1914-15 were psychoanalytic initiates, 
prominent exponents of psychoanalysis who had indulged in reinter- 
'pretations of the data of infantile sexuality that subjected it to other 
(49) Zbid., vol. 17, p. 9. 
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factors, such as the need for power in the case of Adler, or the cultural 
values of the collective unconscious in the case ofJung. 
Freud said substantially the same thing about his new critics in 
another passage of his essay on the Wolf Man, a passage that 1 cite for 
the way in which it indicates how he has abandoned the attempt to 
convince the skeptical. 
The whale and the polar bear, it has been said, cannot wage war on each 
other, for since each is confined to his own element they cannot meet. It is 
just as impossible for me to argue with workers in the field of psychology 
or of the neuroses who do notrecognize the postulates of psycho-analysis 
and who look on its results as artefacts. But during the last few years there 
has grown up another kind of opposition as well, among people who, in 
their own opinion at al1 events, take their stand upon the ground of 
analysis, who do not dispute its technique or results, but who merely 
think themselves justified in drawing other conclusions from the same 
material and in submitting it to other interpretations. 
Hard on the heels of this rather literary version of his asertion of 
disciplinary othodoxy vis 6 vis Adler and Jung, Freud states more 
explicitly than in any other place 1 know of that the presentation of case 
studies is superior to theoretical debate. 
As a mle, however, theoretical controversy is unfmitful. No sooner has 
one begun to depart from the material on which one ought to be relying, 
than one runs the risk of becoming intoxicated with one's own assertions, 
and in the end, of supporting opinions which any observation would have 
contradicted. For this reason it seems to me to be incomparably more 
useful to combat dissentient interpretations by testing them upon par- 
ticular cases and problems (50). 
This pa.ssage speaks very eloquently for itself. 
The disagreement. over the centrality of infantile sexuality between 
Freud on the one hand and Jung and Adler on the other led Freud to 
focus almost exclusively upon the Wolf Man's infantile neurosis, the 
course of which had been terminated in childhood. This complicated 
matters, since it necessitated ((taking into account the distortion and 
refurbishing to which a person's own past is subjected when it is looked 
back upon from a later period)). Noting that the analysis of children 
might yield more convincing results, he asserted that the proceedure he 
had been forced to adopt in the case of the Wolf Man was more 
instructive, precisely on account of the difficulties involved (51). 
(50) Ibid., vol. 17, p. 48. 
(5 1 )  Ibid., vol. 1.7, p. 9. 
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His concentration upon the Wolf Man's infantile neurosis thus 
involved him once again in reporting a severe case «only in a fragmen- 
tary manner)), as he noted in a paranthetical remark at the very 
outset (52). This had become a regular feature of Freud's case studies, 
which, as we shall see, we can not think of as case histories irl the 
traditional sense. As Freud noted in his final chapter, significantly 
entitled not ((Conclusion)) but ((Recapitulations and Problems)), «it must 
be recognized that everything cannot be learnt from a single case and 
that everything cannot be decided by it; we must content ourselves with 
exploiting whatever it may happen to show most clearly~ (53). Freud's 
emphasis upon the pedagogic value of his case studies is accompanied 
here by a statement about why problematic and severe cases have the 
greatest instructive value. 
Analyses which lead to a favourable conclusion in a short time are of 
value in ministering to the therapeutist's self-esteem and substantiate the 
medical importance of psycho-anaiysis; but they remain for the most part 
insignificant as regards the advancement of scientific knowledge. Nothing 
new is learnt from them. In fact they only succeed so quickly because 
everything that was necessary for their accomplishment was aiready 
known. Something new can only be gained from anaiyses that present 
speciai difficulties, and to the overcoming of these a great deai of time has 
to be devoted. Only in such cases do we succeed in descending into the 
deepest and most primitive strata of mental development and in gaining 
from there solutions for the problems of the later formations (54). 
Here we see how Freud would explain the fact that his published 
((exemplars)) are never completely satisfying resolutions of al1 the 
problems involved. Only from the most severe cases where the deepest 
strata are brought to light does one learn anything new, and such severe 
and difficult cases are often so complicated that one could hardly hope 
to reso1v.e them completely and restore such a patient to permanently 
unproblematic emotional stability. The Wolf Man's later difficulties and 
his reanalysis are thus not a reproach to Freud's treatment of him, but a 
confirmation of Freud's expectations (55). For Freud clearly did not 
publish his account of this case because it was such a neat piece of 
therapy; it was rather a particularly revealing investigation of the 
unconscious forces in a severely pathological personality, rich in diffi- 
culty. 
(52) Ibid., vol. 17, p. 7. 
(53) Ibid., vol. 17, p. 105. 
(54) Ibid., vol. 17, p. 10. 
(55) One interesting aspect of the case of the Wolf Man is that later psychoandysts have not 
only returned to write about the case, but the Wolf Man himself was reandyzed, first by 
Freud, and later by Ruth Mack Brunswick and Muriel Gardiner. See Munel Gardiner 
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The case of the Wolf Man was rich in these ((fertile difficulties)), as 
Freud called them, but for that reason complicated the presentation 
even more than his earlier cases. In the final portion of the essay Freud 
ackowledged his fear that his readers would not be able to follow his 
account of the origin and development of the Wolf Man's illness. «The 
description of such early phases and of such deep strata of mental life 
has been a. task which has never before been attacked)) (56 ) ,  he wrote, but 
preferred to make this attempt at the risk of overstraining his own 
expository powers in order to further the exploration of this territory of 
infantile sexuality. Earlier in the essay, at the beginning of his ((General 
Survey of the Patient's Environment and of the History of the Case)), 
Freud had more general things to say about reporting case studies. 
1 am unable to give either a purely historical or a purely thematic account 
of my patient's story; 1 can write a history neither of the treatment nor of 
the illness, but 1 shall find myself obliged to combine the two methods of 
presentation. It is well known that no means has been found of in any way 
introducing into the reproduction of an analysis the sense of conviction 
which results from the anaiysis itself. Exhaustive verbatim reports of the 
proceedings during the hours of analysis would certainly be of no help at 
al1 ... 
Freud appended to this general statement a reminder that ((Analyses 
such as this are not published in order to produce conviction in the 
minds of those whose attitude has hitherto been recusant and scepti- 
cal)) (57); but the main point was that a psychoanalytic case study can 
never be a simple narration, for many st6ries intersect in any analysis. 
There were of course more stories than the history of the illness and the 
treatment involved in Freud's analysis. 1, careful accounting would have 
to include at least 1) the patient's actual life history, 2) the patient's 
narration of his life, 3) the verbatim history of the analysis, 4) the history 
of the psychoanalyst's interpretations, 5) the life history reconstructed by 
the psychoanalyst, and 6) the history of the patient's acquisition of self- 
knowledge. 
-- 
(ed.), The Wolf Man, with «The case of the Wolf Mari» by Sigrnund Freud, and a 
Supplement by Ruth Mack Brunswick, and a Fonvard by Anna Freud (New York, Basic 
Books, 1971). Other studies include OFFENKRANZ, W.; TOBIN, A. (1973), Problems of  
the therapeutic Alliance: Freud and the Wolf Man, International Journal ofPsycho-Analysis, 
54, 75-78; BLUM, H. P. (1974), The Borderline Childhood of the Wolf Man, J o u m l  of the 
American Psychoanalytic Association, 22, 721-742; MEISSNER, W. W. (1977), The Wolf Man 
and the Paranoid Process, The Annuul of Psychoanalysk, 5, 23-74; and CEDO, J. E.; 
GOLDBERG, A. (1973), Models 4 t h  Mind, pp. 115-124. 
(56) Standard Edition, vol. 17, p. 104. 
(57) Ibid., vol. 17, p. 13. 
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The tortuous complexity of Freud's essay on the Wolf Man illustrates 
the violence that Freud's investigations did to the narratives style that 
had been current in the late nineteenth century. The 115 page essay is 
divided into an unprecedented nine parts; The only part that surveys the 
history of the patient's illness occupies scarcely five pages. One of the 
nine parts is anomalously entitled «A Few Discussions», and the 
conclusion, as 1 have already indicated, ((Recapitulations and Pro- 
blems)). This complexity and awkwardness is the result, 1 believe, of a 
long process during which Freud recognized more thoroughly in each 
case study he wrote that intricacy was precisely the virtue of this genre of 
scientific reporting that made it the ideal vehicle for psychoanalytic 
knowledge. But it is extremely important to remember and 1 must 
emphasize that this complexity and awkwardness was not some disad- 
vantage inherent in case studies of psychoanalyses, a disadvantage which 
could be overcome if psychoanalytic knowledge could only be translated 
into theoretical propositions. Ernest Jones said the case was (tassuredly 
the best of the series)), and 1 believe most psychoanalysts would 
agree (58). The complexity was the very strength of the psychoanalytic 
case study that lent it to the propagation of new insights among those 
who already understood the psychoanalytic process of investigation. 
This complexity and intricacy was also, and not incidentally, an impor- 
tant part of the Freudian world-view that migrated into fiction in the 
early twentieth century in the form of strearn-of-conciousness writing 
and other departures from nineteenth century narrative form (59). 
One additional word must be said to link this complexity of 
reporting in which the ((story)) has been lost back to the polemical 
purposes of the essay. Why should Freud have produced such tortuous 
logic in a polemic against Adler and Jung? Wouldn't clarity and 
simplicity have been more to his advantage? For those of us who read 
Freud's cases from without the discourse of psychoanalysis, the answer 
to this last question would surely be yes. But if 1 am right in suggesting 
that Freud's case studies are not only psychoanalytic exemplars, but a 
particular sort of personal knowledge as well, then the answer for 
psychoanalysts is no, and his tortuous thinking is a positive advantage. 
For Freud seems not to have expected that he would convince anyone 
who did not already agree with him about infantile sexuality -he says as 
(58) JONES, E. (1955), The Lfe a d  Work of Sigmund Freud, vol. 2 ,  p. 274. 
(59) 1 would not want this statement to imply an assertion that Freud invented a specifically 
literary genre, only that his dificulties with the narrative form were part of what he 
discovered as his own understanding of his insights matured. This seems at least parallel 
to what developed in prose fliction. 
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much. But he did expect to deepen the conviction and insight of those 
who did agree and want to follow him further in psychoanalysis. For 
them, the psychoanalists willing to study Freud's cases as exemplary 
analyses and extend their command over the tacit knowledge that 
inhered in Freud's practice, the case of the Wolf Man led them once 
again beyond the frontier. 
This concludes my review of Freud's case studies. It bears remarking 
that Freud did write two more briefer case studies, published in 1915 
and 1920 (60), but these do not evidence any advance in Freud's 
thinking on this genre. It may be thought a problem, however, that 
Freud wrote so few case studies after he had finally come to his rather 
definite conclusions about their value in 19 14- 19 15. There would 
necessarily be many components to an explanation of this superficially 
surprising fact. 1 shall merely list several without trying to evaluate their 
relative importance. By the time Freud published his analysis of the 
Wolf Man's infantile neurosis the psychoanalytic movement was defini- 
tely established as a discipline. Freud's followers had begun to present 
and publish their own case studies and Freud devoted considerable 
energy to criticizing and commenting upon their work. Several psy- 
choanalytic journal had been founded to circulate such writings. The 
boundaries of psychoanalysis were set and the major psychoanalytic 
apostates definitively separated from the movement. And Freud him- 
self, relaxing in this atmospbere of long awaited security, turned to more 
publicistic projects designed to secure wider recognition of psychoa- 
nalysis; and, one may surmise without deprecation, to enlarge his 
position in the history of occidental thinking generally. It may also be 
that his old affection for theoretical formulations and his desire to make 
his science respectable to other positivistic scientists reasserted itself 
then (61). In any case, the role of the case studjr in the psychoanalytic 
community itself was secure, and as 1 suggested at the outset, serves to 
this time as the methodological anchor that lends psychoanalysis its 
enduring coherence as a scientific community. 
CONCLUSZON: 
PSYCHOANALYSZS, DZSCOURSE, AND THE FZSSURES ZN KNO WLEDGE 
By the time psychoanalysis grew into an organized discipline of 
research, Freud's case studies had taken on the status of psychoanalytic 
(60) «A Case of Paranoia ... », Standard Edition, vol. 14, pp. 261-272; and «The Psychogenesis of 
a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman)), vol. 18, pp. 145-172. 
(61) See Freud's «Autobiographical Study)), Standard Edition, vol. 20. 
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knowledge par excellence. Not that they constituted the only kind of 
psychoanalytic knowledge. As a first distinction, one might contrast this 
knowledgeforpsychoanalysts deposited in the case studies with the knowledge 
ofpsychoanalysis that Freud purveyed in his more expository and theore- 
tical works (62). A detailed investigation would undoubtedly yield many 
further distinctions based upon differences in the ways in which psy- 
choanalytic knowledge is transmitted and the uses to which it is put (63). 
There are, in other words, many discourses of psychoanalysis. But we do 
not need to begin by knowing everything; i.e., we do not need to make 
an exhaustive study of al1 the differing discourses of psychoanalysis 
before we can begin to distinguish psychoanalytic knowledge from other 
forms of knowledge. if case studies are indeed the genre of peculiarly 
psychoanalytic knowledge -the kernel of Knowledgeforpsychoanalysts- we 
should begin our description of psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic 
knowledge here. 
Freud's oeuvre opened the discourse of psychoanalysis, but it seems 
that all the fissures that have developed in psychoanalytic discourse 
since Freud are prefigured in the fissures of Freud's writing. 1 have 
traced only one of these fissures, showing that behind the explicit 
difference between the genres of Freud's writing intended for different 
audiences there lay a tension between the positivistic notions of science 
that Freud had imbibed with his medical education, in which theory 
predominated, and another notion of knowledge that arose out of or 
was produced by the psychoanalytic mode of knowing itself. The view of 
knowledge implied in Freud's increasing reliance upon case studies, the 
view that can be compared to a combination of Kuhn's exemplars and 
; Polanyi's personal knowledge, never fully triumphed over Freud's 
; commitment to theory and its veracity. But even though this view never 
came to predominate in Freud's mind, we are justified in according it 
the status of a distinguishing feature of psychoanalytic knowledge. For it 
represents the most radical departure from the tradition of positivistic 
scientific discourse in Freud's oeuvre, and we may assume that Freud 
(62) 1 do not allude to Clifford Geertz's distinction between ((model o f ~  and ((model for» here. 
That is quite different. 
(63)  As far as the knowledge of psychoanalysis that is had among non-psychoanalysts is 
concerned, psychoanalysis is obviously one thing for the psychoanalytic patient who has 
come to know psychoanalysis through his or her own experience in analysis and another 
for the academic student of psychoanalysis who has read Freud's treatises by not 
experienced analysis. And similarly, the psychoanalytic knowledge acquired by psy- 
choanalists has many other components than mere ly the case studies, e.g., what they 
learn from their own training analyses, what they appreciate about the concerns of their 
fellow analysts, what they read about analysis, etc. 
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would not have permitted himself to be drawn into such a departure if 
his rnethod and the exigency of communicating with his followers had 
not pulled him in that direction. 
Ironically, this story of how Freud came to view his case studies as 
the locus of peculiarly psychoanalytic knowledge -in spite of himself 
and his positivistic training- is a story that could appear in an 
unreconstructed history of science. Without much exaggeration, we can 
say that the data forced Freud to this view. But Freud's data were not the 
inert data. of the nineteenth century physical science. His data were 
patients, their dreams, their slips of the tongue, and ultimately their 
transferences and Freud's countertransferences. Freud's ambition to 
solve the problem of hysteria gradually led him to transform the 
instrusive hypnotic therapy he learned from the French into a method of 
intersubjectivity. In this he allowed himself to be instructed by the 
patients, starting with Anna O. But this method of intersubjectivity 
-analyzing transferences- yielded knowledge that Freud found it 
difficult if not impossible to convey to readers in the usual genres of 
scientific communication. He found himself organizing a community of 
investigators who experienced transference in their own analyses (often 
with Freud) and in their analyses of patients. For this community, the 
case study proved the ideal genre of communication. Thus Freud was 
forced to his novel view of knowledge by two strictly social configura- 
tions: his relationships with his patients and with the scientific commu- 
nities, first of medicine and physiology and later of psychoanalysis. 
This brings us squarely back to the asertion that the question of 
psychoanalytic knowledge is a question of discourse. For the two 
relationships that pulled Freud toward his view of psychoanalysis as 
personal, exemplary knowledge in the case studies turn out to be the 
irreducible axes of psychoanalytic discourse. The discourse of analyst 
and pa.tient is psychoanalysis in the sense of a practice, and the discourse 
of analyst and fellow analysts is psychoanalysis in the sense of a 
discipline. Without these two levels of discourse any other is unthinka- 
ble. Every other discourse of psychoanalysis derives ultimately from one 
or both of these. 
Freud's case studies (and the case studies published since) are of 
course not identical with these two levels of discourse. But of al1 the 
writings of Freud and his followers, it is in the case studies that the 
discourses of analystlanalysand and analystlfellow analyst are most fully 
precipitated. The discourse of analystlanalysand cannot by its very 
nature be replicated for a reader. As Freud noted in his report on the 
case of the Wolf Man, a verbatim transcript of the words exchanged in a 
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whole analysis would be completely inadequate for representing that 
analysis to a third party (64). But rather than transcribe analyses, Freud 
gradually devised the case study as the vehicle and nearest approxima- 
tion of the intersubjectivity that obtains in an analysis. This approxima- 
tion can be deciphered by other analysts who have experienced trahs- 
ference in the analytic situation. Thus the discourse of analystlfellow 
analyst is much more clearly reflected in the case studies, but again, the 
relationship is not one of equivalence. The case studies are a sediment of 
this discourse, whereas they are translations of the discourse ana- 
lystlanalysand. But in the case studies we hear only one voice in the 
discourse between analysts, the voice of Freud. And we can only attempt 
to infer and extrapolate from that voice the nature of the discourse 
arnong psychoanalysts. With these reservations we can still conclude that 
the case studies constitute the most characteristic and specifically 
psychoanalytic knowledge in the Freudian oeuvre (65). 
Looking back then, what does the evolution of Freud's attitude as he 
wrote the case studies reveal? Freud's awareness of the significance of 
the case study emerged hand in hand with his realization that psychoa- 
nalysis cg>nstituted a new kind of knowledge. Early in his career as a 
psychoanalyst, when Freud thought his insights and discoveries to be 
valuable merely as increments of familiar scientific knowledge, he was 
still oblivious to the importance of his reports on particular cases, even 
embarrassed by them. Only when he began to realize that his new 
insights might constitute a new kind of knowledge did he begin to realize 
that they required a novel sort of reportage. Thus the case studies lead 
' us not only to an appreciation of an important fissure in psychoanalysis 
-the distinction between knowledge for psychoanalysts and the know- 
ledge of psychoanalysis- they lead us to an awareness of the fissures in 
knowledge in general. In its most characteristic form, psychoanalytic 
knowledge cannot be adequately described as science or pseudoscience. 
As a discourse, one discourse or set of discourses among many others, it 
must be described as one of many kinds of knowledge. To confront the 
question of psychoanalytic knowledge, we must bracket the question of 
science. 
(64) Standard Edition, vol. 1 7 ,  p. 13. 
(65) The tensions between the discourse of the anaiyst with himself, the anaiyst with the 
pauent and anaiyst with fellow analyst consutute fissures within the discourse of the case 
studies itself. To examine these a specifically literary method would be necessq .  The 
place to start would be with Gerard Genette, (#rontieres du recitr, Figures 11 (Paris, Seuil, 
1969), pp. 49-69, and ((Discours du recio, Figures 111 (Paris, Seuil, 1972), pp. 67-282. 
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Early in his career Freud was positively intoxicated by the aura of 
natural science and his highest ambition was to make his mark as a 
scientist. As he noted in his Autobiogfaphzcal Study, and other places, 
Freud had never been motivated by inclination to be a heder or 
therapist. Curiosity and ambition led him to science (66). The role of 
scientific ambition is especially clear in The Inteqretation of Dreams where 
he put forward such pseudo-theories as that every dream must be the 
fulfillment. of a wish. Formulae of this sort have enabled philosophers of 
science like the neo-positivist Karl Popper to categorize psychoanalysis 
as a ((pseudo-science)). Popper claims that ((no description whatsoever of 
any logically possible human behavior can be given which would turn 
out to be incompatible with the psychoanalytic theories of Freud)) (67). 
Thus many of Freud's theories appear to be untestable and unscientific. 
This is a criticism that psychoanalysts find difficult if not impossible to 
answer. But 1 have tried to show that it is an inappropriate criticism. 
Certainly it is an uninteresting one (68). If 1 have been right in showing 
that the case study gradually emerged in Freud's work as the locus of the 
most specifically psychoanalytic knowledge, then criticism that suppo- 
ses psychoanaly-sis to-be located in theories is surely misplaced. That is 
not to suggest that psychoanalysis is immune to criticism, of course. A 
knowledge located in exemplary case studies and communicated as 
personal knowledge may have grave problems of its own, but they are 
different problems than those of theoretical sciences. 
- 
(66) See ((Autobiographical Study)), Standard Edition, vol. 20, pp. 8 and 71-72, and «Th 
Question of Lay Analysis)), Standard Edition, vol. 20, pp. 253-254. 
(67) POPPER, K.  R. (1972), Objective Knowledge: an evolutiona~y Approach, Oxford, Claren- 
don, p. 8. 
'68) That may be why Popper has not pursued the matter further than in a few snide remarks 
about psychoanalysis in passing. 
